Responsa for Bava Kamma 54:5
אמר רב זביד משמיה דרבא הוא הדין דאפי' שבר והאי דקתני נתקל איידי דבעי למתני סיפא ואם הוזק בה בעל חבית חייב בנזקו דדוקא נתקל אבל שבר לא מאי טעמא הוא דאזיק אנפשיה קתני רישא נתקל
R. Papa said: Our Mishnah is not consistent unless in accordance with Samuel or R. Johanan, for according to Rab why exemption only in the case of stumbling [over the pitcher]? Why not the same ruling even when one directly broke it? — R. Zebid thereupon said in the name of Raba: The same law applies even when the defendant directly broke it; for AND STUMBLES was inserted merely because of the subsequent clause which reads, IF THE OTHER ONE WAS INJURED BY IT, THE OWNER OF THE BARREL IS LIABLE TO COMPENSATE FOR THE DAMAGE; and which of course applies only to 'stumbling' but not to direct breaking, in which case it only stands to reason that it is the plaintiff who is to blame for the damage he caused to himself. It was therefore on this account that 'stumbling' was inserted in the commencing clause.
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A deposited money with B. Subsequently, C seized this money in payment of the money B owed him. B admits that the money belongs to A. Now A demands it from C.
A. Since B admits that the money belongs to A, C must return it to the latter. The fact that B is responsible for A's deposit and would have to compensate him for its loss, does not make B the owner of the deposited money. Thus the Talmud (B.K. 115a) rules that a creditor who received, from a thief, stolen goods in payment of his debt must return the goods to its original owner.
This Responsum was addressed to Rabbi Asher who took exception to R. Meir's derivation of the law by conclusion ad majus, arguing that our case cannot be compared to that of a thief who repaid his debt with stolen goods, for a thief has acquired his ill-gotten gain sinfully and those who received the goods from him are dealt with severely; but C committed no sin in seizing A's money since "a person may execute judgment on his own behalf" (B.K. 27b). R. Meir, however, pointed out that C also committed a sin in seizing the property of another, for the talmudic dictum "a person may execute judgment on his own behalf" merely means that a person may retrieve his own valuables which he finds in the hands of others; but a creditor is not permitted to seize the valuables of his debtor without a court order.
SOURCES: Cr. 26–7; Mord. B. K. 170; ibid. B. M. 438; Hag. Maim., Nahalot 11, 2; Asher, Responsa 107, 1.
A. Since B admits that the money belongs to A, C must return it to the latter. The fact that B is responsible for A's deposit and would have to compensate him for its loss, does not make B the owner of the deposited money. Thus the Talmud (B.K. 115a) rules that a creditor who received, from a thief, stolen goods in payment of his debt must return the goods to its original owner.
This Responsum was addressed to Rabbi Asher who took exception to R. Meir's derivation of the law by conclusion ad majus, arguing that our case cannot be compared to that of a thief who repaid his debt with stolen goods, for a thief has acquired his ill-gotten gain sinfully and those who received the goods from him are dealt with severely; but C committed no sin in seizing A's money since "a person may execute judgment on his own behalf" (B.K. 27b). R. Meir, however, pointed out that C also committed a sin in seizing the property of another, for the talmudic dictum "a person may execute judgment on his own behalf" merely means that a person may retrieve his own valuables which he finds in the hands of others; but a creditor is not permitted to seize the valuables of his debtor without a court order.
SOURCES: Cr. 26–7; Mord. B. K. 170; ibid. B. M. 438; Hag. Maim., Nahalot 11, 2; Asher, Responsa 107, 1.
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Teshuvot Maharam
A owed money to B and refused to pay his debt. The Rabbis of Spiers, basing their decision on the statement of R. Nahman (B. K. 27b) that a man is permitted to take the law into his own hands, gave B permission to break into A's house and forcefully take possession of A's valuables in payment of the debt.
R. Meir wrote to the Rabbis of Spiers not to ascribe legal absurdities to R. Nahman; for such interpretation of the words of R. Nahman was not only in opposition to an explicit statement of the Mishna (B. M. 9, 13) but was even against the very words of the Pentateuch (Deut. 24,10). A person is permitted according to R. Nahman, to enter into another person's house and take away an object definitely known to be his own, but he is not permitted to touch an object belonging to the other person, unless accompanied by a law-court official.
SOURCES: Cr. 102; Pr. 950; L. 148; cf. Tesh. Maim. to Nezikin, 14; Beth Joseph to Hoshen Mishpat 388.
R. Meir wrote to the Rabbis of Spiers not to ascribe legal absurdities to R. Nahman; for such interpretation of the words of R. Nahman was not only in opposition to an explicit statement of the Mishna (B. M. 9, 13) but was even against the very words of the Pentateuch (Deut. 24,10). A person is permitted according to R. Nahman, to enter into another person's house and take away an object definitely known to be his own, but he is not permitted to touch an object belonging to the other person, unless accompanied by a law-court official.
SOURCES: Cr. 102; Pr. 950; L. 148; cf. Tesh. Maim. to Nezikin, 14; Beth Joseph to Hoshen Mishpat 388.
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Teshuvot Maharam
A owed money to B and refused to pay his debt. The Rabbis of Spiers, basing their decision on the statement of R. Nahman (B. K. 27b) that a man is permitted to take the law into his own hands, gave B permission to break into A's house and forcefully take possession of A's valuables in payment of the debt.
R. Meir wrote to the Rabbis of Spiers not to ascribe legal absurdities to R. Nahman; for such interpretation of the words of R. Nahman was not only in opposition to an explicit statement of the Mishna (B. M. 9, 13) but was even against the very words of the Pentateuch (Deut. 24,10). A person is permitted according to R. Nahman, to enter into another person's house and take away an object definitely known to be his own, but he is not permitted to touch an object belonging to the other person, unless accompanied by a law-court official.
SOURCES: Cr. 102; Pr. 950; L. 148; cf. Tesh. Maim. to Nezikin, 14; Beth Joseph to Hoshen Mishpat 388.
R. Meir wrote to the Rabbis of Spiers not to ascribe legal absurdities to R. Nahman; for such interpretation of the words of R. Nahman was not only in opposition to an explicit statement of the Mishna (B. M. 9, 13) but was even against the very words of the Pentateuch (Deut. 24,10). A person is permitted according to R. Nahman, to enter into another person's house and take away an object definitely known to be his own, but he is not permitted to touch an object belonging to the other person, unless accompanied by a law-court official.
SOURCES: Cr. 102; Pr. 950; L. 148; cf. Tesh. Maim. to Nezikin, 14; Beth Joseph to Hoshen Mishpat 388.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A group of Jews of town T, without the knowledge or consent of the other Jewish inhabitants of T, formed a community organization and elected a single governing body with the power of apportioning taxes and managing all other communal and religious affairs. This organization assumed the authority to exercise these powers on all the inhabitants of T. Rabbi Meir Kohen, however, protested denying their authority, and refused to pay the taxes levied on him. He was willing to become a member of the community and share in the carrying of the community burden, provided he be permitted such rights in the election of leaders as were held by the other members of the community, or that the taxes be levied equitably, i.e., in exact proportion to a person's wealth. The elected leaders refused to accede to R. Meir's wishes and, with the help of Gentiles, forced their way into R. Meir's house and seized some of his valuables as pledges for the unpaid taxes. R. Meir retaliated by hiring other Gentiles who took back his valuables by force.
A. The Jews of T who have banded together in electing leaders and giving them authority to manage all communal affairs, had no right to do so even though they represented a majority of the Jewish inhabitants of T, as long as a minority took no part in the reorganization, for no new custom or institution can be established in a community without the knowledge and consent of all its inhabitants. The talmudic statement: "The inhabitants of a city are permitted to enforce their rulings" (B.B. 8b), means: a) If the people of a city unanimously agree to enact a certain ruling, they are permitted to punish and fine anyone who subsequently disregards that ruling; or, b) the seven leaders of a community, originally elected with the knowledge and consent of all the members of the community to manage community affairs and to punish offenders, have the right to enforce their rulings and decrees. But, no majority of city dwellers can force a minority to be governed by a ruling to the original passing of which they have not consented, or to accept the authority of leaders whom they have not consented to elect.
Moreover, any ordinance passed by the inhabitants of a city without the knowledge or consent of a great man (a scholar) residing in their midst, is void and is not binding even upon those who passed the ordinance (B.B. 9a). There can be no doubt, therefore, that no community can pass an ordinance to be binding upon the scholar himself, unless he agrees to its enactment. Thus, an organization established against the express wishes of R. Meir Kohen, a person of high standing and scholarship, has no right to force its authority on all the inhabitants of T. Therefore, R. Meir had the right to resort to the help of Gentiles in order to recover his valuables.
SOURCES: Pr. 968; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 299c; ibid. p. 363b.
A. The Jews of T who have banded together in electing leaders and giving them authority to manage all communal affairs, had no right to do so even though they represented a majority of the Jewish inhabitants of T, as long as a minority took no part in the reorganization, for no new custom or institution can be established in a community without the knowledge and consent of all its inhabitants. The talmudic statement: "The inhabitants of a city are permitted to enforce their rulings" (B.B. 8b), means: a) If the people of a city unanimously agree to enact a certain ruling, they are permitted to punish and fine anyone who subsequently disregards that ruling; or, b) the seven leaders of a community, originally elected with the knowledge and consent of all the members of the community to manage community affairs and to punish offenders, have the right to enforce their rulings and decrees. But, no majority of city dwellers can force a minority to be governed by a ruling to the original passing of which they have not consented, or to accept the authority of leaders whom they have not consented to elect.
Moreover, any ordinance passed by the inhabitants of a city without the knowledge or consent of a great man (a scholar) residing in their midst, is void and is not binding even upon those who passed the ordinance (B.B. 9a). There can be no doubt, therefore, that no community can pass an ordinance to be binding upon the scholar himself, unless he agrees to its enactment. Thus, an organization established against the express wishes of R. Meir Kohen, a person of high standing and scholarship, has no right to force its authority on all the inhabitants of T. Therefore, R. Meir had the right to resort to the help of Gentiles in order to recover his valuables.
SOURCES: Pr. 968; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 299c; ibid. p. 363b.
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